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TAX REFORM -
THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE
By WOLFE D. GOODMAN*
Everyone who was involved in the decade of intense activity in the area
of tax reform which began with the appointment of the Carter Commission
in 19621 and ended in 1971 with the enactment of Bill C-259, the Income
Tax Amending Bill,2 must struggle against the weariness that this activity
engendered, if tax reform is not to become a dead issue. It must not be
allowed to die, because the basic criticisms of our federal taxation system
which were expressed by the Carter Commission in its 1966 Report8 are still
applicable to the present system; indeed, in a number of cases, the system
has become even more inequitable, and reform just as necessary.
While equity is not the only criterion by which a tax system is to be
judged, since simplicity and ease of administration and the provision of
appropriate tax incentives must also be considered, a grossly inequitable tax
system is simply unacceptable. It is astonishing that the Canadian people
have been prepared to accept, as part of the allegedly reformed Income Tax
Act,4 a system which so obviously and so markedly departs from the prin-
ciple of taxing in accordance with ability to pay. While other examples could
be selected for the purpose of illustrating this situation, this article will con-
centrate on the integration of corporate and individual taxation, an area in
which we seem not merely not to have made any progress towards greater
equity since 1971, but to have actually retrogressed.
It will be recalled that under the Income Tax ActP prior to the major
tax reforms of 1971, corporations in Ontario were subject to a corporate tax
rate of 23 per cent (11 per cent federal tax and 12 per cent Ontario tax)
on the first $35,000 per year of taxable income from any source6 and to a
O Copyright, 1978, Wolfe D. Goodman.
* Mr. Goodman, Q.C., D.Jur., is a member of the firm Goodman and Carr,
Toronto, Ontario.
1 Order-in-Council, PC 1962-1334.
2 An Act to Amend the Income Tax Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63.
3 Can. Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation (Ottawa: Queen's Printer,
1966) [hereinafter Carter Report].
4 S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63.
5 Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 148, as amended.
6 Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 148, s. 39(1) as amended by S.C. 1957-58, c. 17,
s. 4(1); S.C. 1961, c. 17, s. 5(1).
Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 148, s. 40(1) as amended by S.C. 1952-53, c. 40,
s. 59; S.C. 1956, c. 39, s. 9; S.C. 1958, c. 32, s. 17; S.C. 1960, c. 43, s. 12; S.C. 1960-61,
c. 49, s. 19(1); S.C. 1962-63, c. 8, s. 9(1); and S.C. 1966-67, c. 91, s. 9(1).
Old Age Security Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 200, s. 24(5).
Corporations Tax Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 91, s. 5(1).
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rate of 52 per cent (40 per cent federal tax and 12 per cent Ontario tax) on
the excess of taxable income over $35,000. 7 In addition, Canadian resident
individuals who received dividends from taxable Canadian corporations were
entitled to a dividend tax credit against their ordinary tax liability of 20 per
cent of the amount of such dividends.8 Finally, for each dollar of ordinary
dividends paid, a Canadian corporation was entitled to elect to pay a special
15 per cent tax on a further dollar and to distribute the remaining 85 per cent
to shareholders as a non-taxable distribution.9
This system was strongly criticized by the Carter Commission in its
1966 Report.1" The Carter Commission commented on the dual rate struc-
ture, "the determination of eligibility for, and the prevention of abuse of, the
provision has been the source of endless difficulty in the fifteen years since
the dual rate was introduced."'1 It also pointed out that where corporate
income was subject to tax at the higher corporate rate, the combined burden
of corporate and individual taxes on Canadian resident individual share-
holders in low tax brackets was enormously greater than the taxes they would
have paid on the same amount of income earned directly (more than 2
times as much, in some cases), while the combined burden on shareholders
in high tax brackets could be as much as 1/5th less than on the same amount
of income earned directly.12 On the other hand, if corporate income were
subject to tax at the lower corporate rate and if maximum advantage were
taken of a 'mix' of salary, dividends and special distributions, the combined
burden on shareholders in low tax brackets was similar to that on an income
earned directly, but the combined burden on shareholders in middle tax
brackets was about 1/5th less and on those in high brackets, about 1/10th
less than on income earned directly.' 3
In order to eliminate these inequities, the Carter Commission proposed
a system of integrating corporate and individual taxes, so that the combined
burden of taxes at the corporate and shareholder level on distributed corpo-
rate profits would equal the burden on the same amount of income earned
directly by the individual, without the interposition of a corporation. 14 In
order to avoid the accumulation of income in corporations by individuals in
7 Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 148, s. 39(1) as amended by S.C. 1957-58, c. 17,
s. 4(1); S.C. 1959, c. 45, s. 13(1); and S.C. 1960-61, c. 17, s. 5(1).
Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 148, s. 40(1) as amended by S.C. 1952-53, c. 40,
s. 59; S.C. 1956, c. 39, s. 9; S.C. 1958, c. 32, s. 17; S.C. 1960, c. 43, s. 12; S.C. 1960-61,
c. 49, s. 19(1); S.C. 1962-63, c. 8, s. 9(1); and S.C. 1966-67, c. 91, s. 9(1).
Old Age Security Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 200, s. 24(5).
Corporations Tax Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 91, s. 5(1).
8 lncome Tax Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 148, s. 38(1) as amended by S.C. 1952-53,
c. 40, s. 57(1); S.C. 1957, c. 29, s. 11; and S.C. 1958, c. 32, s. 16.
9 Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 148, s. 105.
10 Carter Report, supra note 3, Volume IV, at 617.
11 ld., at 94.
12 Id., at 618, 619.
1 Id.
14 Carter Report, supra note 3, passim.
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high tax brackets, the corporate tax rate would be set at the same level as
the maximum individual rate of 50 per cent.
In essence, the Commission's technique for achieving integration was
very simple. Assume that a corporation earned $100, on which it paid $50
tax. When it distributed a dividend of the remaining $50, the shareholder
would be deemed to have received a gross dividend of $100, in respect of
which $50 tax had already been paid on his behalf. If he was taxed at a
marginal rate of 50 per cent, he would pay no more tax; but, if he was taxed
at a lower marginal rate, he would receive a refund of part of the tax which
had been paid on his behalf.
The system proposed by the Carter Commission was generally similar in
effect to the method of taxing investment income of private corporations
which was enacted in 1971, as modified by the Income Tax Amending Act
of 1977'r which implements the Federal Budget of March 31, 1977. As so
modified, the theory is that $100.00 of investment income, initially bears
$50.00 of corporate tax. However, $16.67 of refundable dividend tax on
hand (RDTOH) is created, which is refunded at the rate of $1.00 for every
$4.00 of dividends paid. Accordingly, commencing in 1978, the corporation
can distribute a dividend of $66.67, consisting of $50.00 of after-tax income
and $16.67 of refunded RDTOH. This dividend is then grossed-up by 50
per cent and treated as a gross dividend of $100.00, on which $33.33 tax has
already been paid. Only a shareholder in a personal tax bracket higher than
33 1/3 per cent will have additional tax to pay, while one in a lower bracket
can offset the excessive tax against his tax liability on income from other
sources, if any.
Viewed in this abstract manner, it is difficult to understand why the
Carter Commission's integration proposals (which were initially adopted by
the federal government in its White Paper of 196910) created such opposition
from taxpayers wishing to retain the existing dividend tax credit system that
the government was forced to drop these proposals and to adopt instead a
modified dividend tax credit. The reason for the opposition is that it was
inherent in the Commission's integration proposals that credit should be
given to shareholders only for taxes actually paid by the corporation. The
shareholders of corporations in the resource industries, which frequently paid
little or nothing in income taxes, because of generous deductions for deple-
tion and exploration and development expenses; and the shareholders of
corporations with extensive foreign operations, carried on by foreign subsidi-
aries or branches, which paid little or nothing in Canadian taxes in respect
of these operations, would be subject to much greater taxation of their divi-
dends under the integration proposals than under the existing dividend tax
credit system.
Under the modified dividend tax credit system which Canada adopted
in 1971, Canadian resident shareholders became entitled to the benefit of the
credit in respect of all taxable dividends received from a Canadian corpora-
15lncome Tax Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63, ss. 82(1), 121, as amended by (Bill
C-11) S.C. 1977-78, c. 1, ss. 36, 58.
36 Can. Proposals for Tax Reform (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966).
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tion, whether or not the corporation actually paid any Canadian taxes. 7 For
example, assume that a Canadian corporation receives a dividend of $1,000
from its wholly-owned Ruritanian subsidiary, subject only to Ruritanian with-
holding tax of $50. Even though the Canadian corporation will pay no Cana-
dian tax on this dividend, if the remaining $950 is then distributed as a
dividend to a Canadian resident shareholder under the rules enacted in the
1977 Income Tax Amending Act18 he will be treated as having received a
gross dividend of $1,425 on which $475 tax has already been paid on his
behalf. If he is in a 50 per cent marginal personal tax rate, he will have to
pay only $237.50 in tax on this dividend, even though Canada collected no
tax at all at the corporate level.
It is perhaps arguable that it is inherent in our system of tax incentives
for resource industries that tax concessions at the corporate level should not
be taxed away when resource industry profits are distributed to shareholders:
If they are taxed away on distribution to shareholders they become merely
a tax deferral which, while significant, still offers considerably less incentive
to invest in these industries. No such justification, however, can exist for ex-
tending the benefit of the dividend tax credit to Canadian corporations which
pay no Canadian tax on the income they earn on their foreign operations.
In 1975, when the United Kingdom enacted its imputation system,",
(really another name for a dividend tax credit), in order to provide a sub-
stantial degree of integration of corporate and individual taxation, care was
taken to ensure that this situation would not arise. Advance corporation tax
(ACT) of £35 is payable currently by a corporation when it pays a divi-
dend of X-65. As its name implies, advance corporation tax is treated as a
prepayment of the corporation's tax liability. Consequently, if the dividend
has been declared out of income which has not actually borne U.K. corpora-
tion tax, the ACT which the corporation pays in respect of the dividend will
not be offset against its current tax liability, but it can be carried forward and
offset against any future liability. The U.K. system has the merit of avoiding
much of the complexity of the integration system proposed in the Carter
Commission's Report20 or in the 1969 White Paper,21 while at the same time
protecting the Revenue against having to grant shareholders a dividend tax
credit in respect of corporate taxes which have not actually been paid. It
would not be unduly difficult to modify this system for Canadian use. In fact,
the Carter Commission's proposals included a somewhat similar provision in
respect of corporate income from foreign sources.22 If Canada were to adopt
the U.K. system, it might also require a sort of notional advance corporation
tax for resource industries which benefit from tax incentive legislation, if it
were considered essential to pass their incentives through to shareholders.
171ncome Tax Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63, ss. 82(1), 121 as amended by S.C.
1977-78, c. 1, ss. 36, 58.
18 S.C. 1977-78, c. 1.
19 Finance Act, 1972, 20 & 21 Eliz. 2, c. 41, ss. 84, 86.
2o Supra note 3.
21 Supra note 16.
22 Carter Report, supra note 3, Volume IV, at 89.
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The Canadian system of full integration for investment income of private
corporations, but only partial integration for active business income, defies
common sense. A private corporation earning $100,000 of investment in-
come, is, in theory, subject to corporate tax of $50,000, which creates $16,667
of RDTOH (under the provisions in the 1977 Income Tax Amending Act23 ).
It can distribute a dividend of $66,667 to its shareholders, which is grossed-
up to $100,000 in their hands. If they are in a 50 per cent personal marginal
tax rate they will, in theory, pay an additional $16,667 of personal tax, so
that they will have $50,000 after tax income out of the $100,000 of corpo-
rate investment income, exactly the same amount as if they had earned this
income personally. This is entirely reasonable.
Actually, this is not the exact result, since both corporate and individual
rates differ slightly from these figures. If we use the current rates of 36 per
cent federal corporation tax24 and 12 per cent provincial corporation tax26
and if we assume a federal individual tax rate of 35 per cent and a provincial
individual tax rate of 44 per cent of the federal tax, then, as the following
calculation shows, there is a slight advantage in earning investment income
indirectly through a corporation rather than directly.
Corporate income $100,000
Corporate tax @ 48% 48,000
After-tax corporate income 52,000
RDTOH 16,667
Total possible dividend 68,667
Gross-up 50% 34,333
Grossed-up dividend 103,000
Gross federal tax @ 35% 36,050
Less: federal dividend tax credit 25,750
Net federal tax 10,300
Provincial tax @ 44% 4,532
Total personal tax 14,832
After-tax income 53,835 (53.83 percent)
If $100,000 of investment income had been earned directly by an indi-
vidual in a 35 percent federal marginal tax rate (combined federal and
provincial rate, 50.4 percent), the tax would have been $50,400 and the
after-tax income would have been only $49,600, a difference of $4,235,
indicating that an individual earning investment income indirectly through a
corporation has over 8 percent more after-tax income than one earning such
income directly.
Contrast this with the taxation of $100,000 of Canadian active business
income which is earned by a corporation which has already used up its small
business deduction26 or which does not qualify for this deduction:
23 S.C. 1977-78, c. 1.
24 lncome Tax Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63, ss. 123(e), 124.
2 5 Corporations Tax Act, S.O. 1972, c. 143, s. 102.
26 Income Tax Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63, s. 125.
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Corporate income
Corporate tax @ 48%
After-tax corporate income
Gross-up at 50%
Grossed-up dividend
Gross federal tax @ 35%
Less: federal dividend tax credit
Net federal tax
Provincial tax @ 44%
Total personal tax
After-tax income
$100,000
48,000
52,000
26,000
78,000
27,300
19,500
7,800
3,432
11,232
40,768 (40.77 percent)
When one considers that corporations which carry on active business in
Canada usually employ substantial numbers of people and provide further
employment through their purchases of Canadian materials, equipment and
services, it is difficult to understand why a shareholder in a Canadian corpo-
ration earning the same amount of investment income, perhaps by merely
clipping bond coupons, ends up with 32 percent more after-tax income than
a shareholder in a corporation which actively participates in the Canadian
economy.
This situation is ameliorated to some extent, but not entirely eliminated,
if the corporation carries on an active business which qualifies for the tax
reduction in respect of manufacturing and processing profits. 27
Corporate income
Corporate tax @ 42%
After-tax corporate income
Gross-up @ 50%
Grossed-up dividend
Gross federal tax @ 35%
Less: federal dividend tax credit
Net federal tax
Provincial tax @ 44%
Total personal tax
After-tax income
$100,000
42,000
58,000
29,000
87,000
30,450
21,750
8,700
3,828
12,528
45,472 (45.47 percent)
While the goal of encouraging manufacturing and processing industries
may be commendable, it should be remembered that since World War II
there has been a significant reduction in the percentage of the labour force
employed in such industries and an increase in the percentage of those em-
ployed in service industries. This means that shareholders in the service
industries, upon which we are primarily relying to expand employment, are
bearing a relatively greater burden of taxation.
When corporate income fully qualifies for the small business deduction
27 Income Tax Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63, s. 124.
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and also qualifies for the 9 percent Ontario corporations tax rate2 8 for small
businesses, the total corporate tax is only 24 percent. In this case, there is
actually a substantial advantage, over 20 percent, in carrying on business
through a corporation rather than directly, as a proprietor or partner.
Corporate income
Corporate tax @ 24%
After-tax corporate income
Gross-up @ 50%
Grossed-up dividend
Gross federal tax @ 35%
Less: federal dividend tax credit
Net federal tax
Provincial tax @ 44%
Total personal tax
After-tax income
$100,000
24,000
76,000
38,000
114,000
39,900
28,500
11,400
5,016
16,416
59,584 (59.58 percent)
The figure of $59,584 of after-tax income shown above should again be
compared with the after-tax income of $49,600 which is available to a
proprietor or partner carrying on a similar business in unincorporated form.
Particularly when one bears in mind the advantage of being able to accumu-
late income in the corporation, at a tax cost of only 24 percent, and to defer
payment of dividends until it is convenient to do so, the tax advantage of
operating through a corporation seems indefensible.
This extraordinary disparity is enhanced if the small business corpora-
tion also qualifies for the tax reduction in respect of manufacturing and
processing profits.
Corporate income
Corporate tax @ 19%
After-tax corporate income
Gross-up @ 50%
Grossed-up dividend
Gross federal tax @ 35%
Less: federal dividend tax credit
Net federal tax
Provincial tax @ 44%
Total personal tax
After-tax income
$100,000
19,000
81,000
40,500
121,500
42,525
30,375
12,150
5,346
17,496
63,504 (63.50 percent)
It seems impossible to justify a situation in which an individual can
increase his after-tax income on $100,000 of manufacturing profits from
$49,600 to $63,504, an increase of over 28 percent, simply by incorporating
his business. Nor is this the only advantage which he obtains by incorporating.
The profits which the unincorporated proprietor reinvests in his business will
have borne tax at his personal rate, which we have assumed to be 50.4 per-
28 Corporations Tax Act, S.O. 1972, c. 143, s. 106(a) as amended by S.O. 1976,
c. 32, s. 11; amended S.O. 1976, c. 63, s. 1.
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cent, while the profits which the incorporated manufacturer reinvests have
borne tax of only 19 percent.
The federal government's refusal to adopt a dividend tax credit system
which would provide, in effect, for full integration of corporate and indi-
vidual taxation is sometimes defended on the basis that corporation tax is
probably not fully borne by shareholders and that it may be in part shifted
back to employees and suppliers and in part shifted forward to customers.
However, when Parliament decides how much income tax a taxpayer should
pay, it does not appear, usually, to take into account whether or not he can
recoup his tax burden in whole or in part. The Carter Commission therefore
quite sensibly rejected this line of argument.29 In any event, it is much more
likely that it was simply the loss of tax revenue which a system of full inte-
gration would have entailed which persuaded the government to adopt the
present system in 1971.
In theory, the present system provides for full integration of income
earned from an active business and fully qualifying for the small business
deduction; partial integration for income earned from an active business
which does not so qualify; and full integration for investment income earned
by a private corporation. In practice, however, as the illustrations given
above demonstrate, the present system falls short of even these limited objec-
tives. Active business income of a corporation qualifying for the small busi-
ness deduction is likely to bear less total tax than similar income earned by
an individual and this disparity is enormously increased if the corporate in-
come is derived from manufacturing or processing. On the other hand, even
with the far more generous dividend tax credit enacted as a result of the
Federal Budget 0 of March 31, 1977, active business income which is not
derived from manufacturing or processing and which is earned by a corpora-
tion which does not qualify for the small business deduction still suffers a
substantial burden of double taxation, even though it is the expansion of such
businesses which may have to be relied upon to an increasing extent to provide
Canadians with new jobs.
Clearly, we are even further removed today than we ever were from
the Carter Commission's very desirable goal of subjecting income earned
indirectly through a corporation and distributed to a shareholder to the same
total amount of corporate and individual taxes as income earned directly by
an individual. It behooves us to ask how we managed to create this unfor-
tunate result and whether we shall ever be able to achieve this goal. It is
submitted that short term political expediency and an undue concentration
on tax incentives has created most unjust results. A self-assessment system
of income tax, such as we have become accustomed to in this country, ulti-
mately depends on the vast majority of the population considering that the
burden is being shared fairly equitably by all segments of the population.
When more Canadians realize how grossly unfair our tax system has become
the self-assessment system is likely to break down and we shall then require
a vast army of tax collectors to enforce the law.
29 Carter Report, supra note 3, Volume I at 27; Volume IV at 27.
30 Budget message, March 31, 1977.
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